How Ius Became Subjective
Since the end of the 1970s, the expression "subjective right" has appeared with increasing frequency in writings dealing with problems in, or the history of, moral, legal, political and social philosophy. Before then, it was hardly ever encountered in such writings. It emerged in certain recent scholarly investigations of the rights-concepts used by mediaeval and early-modern authors such as Aquinas, Ockham, Gerson, Suárez, Grotius and many others. Their works were almost without exception in Latin and the key term signifying a right was ius (recommended pronunciation: like the noun "use").
It was always well understood that ius was polysemous (Justinian, Digest, 1.1.11: "Ius pluribus modis dicitur"). As noted by Brian Tierney, a leading authority in this field of inquiry, some mediaeval authors vied with each other in their efforts to discern different meanings (Tierney 1997, 40) . One of them, Johannes Monachus in 1310 jestingly even included ius in the sense of broth, as if this homonymy (a relation between two words) was yet another equivocation. The joke, incidentally, was already to be found in Plautus.
An important distinction was that between ius in the sense of lex or complexus legum (a law, or the Law, i.e. a system of norms) and ius in the sense of potestas or facultas (power or ability or capacity; see Suárez 1973, 2.17.2) . In the latter sense, but not in the former, a ius was something that a rational agent has, and in virtue of which the agent can do or may do certain things, or in virtue of which other rational agents can or cannot or must or must not do certain things. Briefly, ius in the former sense is a law or a system of law, but in the latter sense it is a right.
A salient difference between these two concepts of ius is that rights have bearers, and laws and the Law do not. A right belongs to someone or something: a person, an individual, a body corporate-it belongs to a subject.
The core meaning of ius in ancient Rome was roughly what we would think of as "the Law." It is a system in virtue of which actions are lawful or unlawful, with sanctions attached. Other terms with meanings of a 1 This is not to say that every occurrence of a pleonasm is a solecism. similar character are language and custom. Like ius, such terms do not designate something that any particular individual possesses and is in a position to control or decide upon. But the ius of the tribe could in appropriate circumstances empower an individual. A person could become king iure by a decision of the people and ratification by the senate. But in the absence of this, Tarquin had no ius regni (right to be king) other than brute force (Livy, Ab urbe condita, 1.49.3)-that is, he had none. Ius regni is determined by the Law.
Different from this was a later conception: by sheer usurpation or by some formality, a king or an emperor could come to have all of ius as his own. This would generate a new concept of ius. The Law would now belong to the sovereign-it would be his. Ius could then be understood in the sense of jurisdiction.
2 The sovereign would be above the law and have full power to determine what is lawful.
The attribution of (normative) power to a person in this way engendered a distinctively "modern" and new sense of ius. When combined with ancient, especially Stoic, ideas of natural freedom and equality, it follows that in the state of nature every individual is a sovereign. The creative faculty, attributed to the emperor or the king, is no longer monopolized. Within his realm, every individual can, by means of an act of will, bring obligations into being (see Hägerström 1965, 82-4) . On agreeing with others to become a citizen, the individual in the state of nature surrenders parts of his natural sovereignty-though not all of it, according to most writers on natural law.
What has now been outlined points to a plausible explanation of how ius, the Law, could come to be attributed to individuals and in that sense be subjective. So when it comes to terminology, one might tentatively suppose that in the old texts the impersonal conception of the Law could be styled ius understood obiective (objectively) and the personal one of a right as something that a person has, a power to create (or extinguish) obligations, would be styled ius understood subiective (subjectively). One could, further, tentatively suppose that present-day scholars, immersing themselves in these texts and becoming influenced by them, would have allowed these Latin expressions to immigrate and be assimilated, in keeping with the entrenched spirit of hospitality characteristic of the English language. This would explain how the solecism emerged.
But these tentative hypotheses, designed to explain how subjective might have come to qualify right, are untenable. Mediaeval authors (Lullus, Scotus, Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa et al.) did use the non-classical adjectives subiectivus and obiectivus and their cognates in other contexts, but neither they nor later early-modern authors use those words to distinguish the two senses of ius-indeed, they could not. Those adjectives (and cognates) did 2 Downer 1972, 320 indicates places in the text where ius has this sense.
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Thomas Mautner not then have the meaning that we now assign to them, and could therefore not have been used to mark the difference between rights and laws. From the early scholastics up to the mid-seventeenth century when a change was underway, an obiectum was in the mind, and a subiectum was a bearer of properties and in that capacity a part of the real world out there (see Sainati 2006; Lalande 1988; Kible 1998) . As late as 1686, " 'objectively' was used to mean 'in the mind' and not 'in reality' " (Bayle, 2005, 235;  cf. also editor's [John Kilcullen] note at 578). Almost four centuries earlier, Ockham denied the reality of universals by insisting that they have objective existence only (Guzmán 2003 , n. 103)!
"Ius" Said to Have a Subjective Sense
So, when present-day scholars who have immersed themselves in these mediaeval and early-modern Latin works combine subjective and right, it cannot be due to an influence from a corresponding Latin combination in those works. It is of interest to establish when that combination first emerged. Early occurrences can be found in Gottfried Achenwall's Ius naturae and his shorter Prolegomena iuris naturalis, both from the mid-1750s, with many later editions. He wrote:
A person's physical faculty, insofar as it is not contrary to any moral law, is a moral faculty, and, in a word, a (moral) ius taken broadly and subjectively or as an attribute of a person. (Achenwall 1781a, 14) 3 A precursor of those two works was Elementa iuris naturae 1750, coauthored with his colleague in Göttingen, Johann Stephan Pütter. This, incidentally, was rare indeed, as the authors note in their preface. Their explanation was that in this discipline philosophers hardly ever agreed. In this work, the expression was introduced as follows: "The moral faculty to coerce another person is called ius understood subjectively, as a quality of a person" (Pütter and Achenwall 1750, 47). 4 This earlier formulation is too narrow and does not cover the authors' intended sense. They cannot have believed that all rights we have are rights to coerce others. What they meant is that coercive measures are permissible only in case of violation of a right properly so called. This is also how Kant's formulation, that right and the permissibility of coercion "mean the same," ought to be understood (Kant 1797, 232 Many other writers at the time, following Grotius, noted the same distinction, though not in these terms. For example, "the word ius may be taken to mean either a law or an ability to act (or, as Grotius says, an attribute of a person)" (Fleischer 1730, 1.5 .1).
6 Similar Grotius-inspired statements were common (Pufendorf 1684, 1.1.20; Thomasius 1720, 1.1.82; Thomasius 1718, 1.5.1; Gundling 1715, §57, §58 in a later edition). 7 Grotius's definition (Grotius 1625, 1.1.4.-1.1.5) was indeed the main point of reference in the literature. He recognised three senses of ius. In the sense of a right or power, the one relevant here, a ius was a qualitas moralis personae competens ad aliquid iuste habendum vel agendum-a moral quality belonging to a person to have or do something lawfully.
As for the translation of this clause, it is to be noted that competens means belonging to. There should be no comma after the dative personae. The constructions facultas ad, aptitudo ad were in use, as the following quotations show, and by analogy, qualitas ad (used by Grotius to cover both) would be easily understood. "Lawfully" preserves the ambiguity of iuste. It can mean either validly (with legal effect) or justly (rightly, not contrary to law). The former refers to what one can do, the latter to what one may do. Grotius was aware of the distinction.
8 Many eighteenth-century authors who adopted his definition were not. They inclined towards the latter sense and failed clearly to distinguish powers from permissions.
For Grotius, a ius proprie aut stricte dictum-a ius properly so called-is a qualitas moralis perfecta, and facultas nobis dicitur-a perfect moral quality which we call a faculty (ability, power, capacity). Grotius, using the very same words as Suárez (see Suárez 1973, 1 Grotius was by no means alone in noting that ius could denote something that a person has. Molina defined one sense of ius as a facultas aliquid faciendi sive obtinendi, a faculty to do or to receive something, and wrote: "Altero modo dicitur aliquis habere ius ad aliquid, non quod sit ei aliquid debitum, sed quod facultatem habeat ad aliquid" (in another sense it is said that someone has a right to something not because it is owed to him, but because he has the faculty in respect of it).
9 And Suárez wrote: "Ius enim interdum significat moralem facultatem ad rem aliquam" (Ius sometimes signifies a moral faculty in respect of a thing). (Suárez 1973, 2.17 .2).
Achenwall and Pütter were not, however, the first to combine subiectivum and ius to distinguish ius in the sense of a right from ius in the sense of a law or the Law. Alejandro Guzmán, who seems to have been the first to investigate this matter (Guzmán 2003) 10 Guzmán locates the passages he cites to the 1745 edition, but they seem in fact to appear for the first time in the revised "editio tertia" of 1748. Important are also his Observationes iuris naturalis, 2 vols, (Darjes 1751), which comment on his earlier textbook, reply to objections and provide ample guidance to the relevant literature.
The number of authors of works on natural law used in the German universities was great indeed. Those of Achenwall and Darjes were, together with Wolff's, the ones most widely used in the period 1750-1790. Kant used Achenwall's in his lecture course on natural law. My own sampling of early eighteenth-century authors like Buddeus, Gundling, Wolff, and Köhler has so far not revealed any earlier linking of ius with the adjective subiectivum or the adverb subiective. Until further notice, Darjes can claim priority.
Guzmán gives a useful survey of the radical change of meaning of subiectum, obiectum and their cognates, adverted to above, which was well under way by the late seventeenth century and for the first time, made it possible for subiectum and cognates to be used in this way. As he observes, there had been previous links with the noun. Leibniz had described a person who has a right (jus) or an obligation as a subjectum qualitatis moralis-a bearer of a moral quality. A subjectum juris is a personal being who has a right or power. Thus he writes, "Deus est subjectum juris summi in omnia"-God possesses the highest right over everything (Leibniz 1667, 9 15; 1990b, 301) . In his textbook, Darjes mentions iura which are taken to exist in a certain subject (in subiecto quodam), and to be a quality of a person (qualitas personae) (see Darjes 1745, sec. 9) .
Expressions combining ius with the adverb subiective appear in a new preface that Darjes wrote for the third edition of his textbook in 1748, in reply to a radical and quite colourful attack on mainstream natural law theory by Johann Jacob Schmauss (1690 Schmauss ( -1757 , Professor in Göttingen, who maintained that whatever instincts nature has implanted in us are in accord with the law of nature, to be distinguished from inclinations or aversions due to the influence from nurture, convention and positive law (Schmauss 1748 ). Darjes opposed this, claiming that Schmauss had overlooked, or denied, the radical difference between, for example, drinking to slake one's thirst and drinking to get drunk, or between concubitus and stuprum. Only the first in these pairs accord with nature. Some instincts and propensities are unnatural. He relied on a conception of natural tendencies, inherent in the nature of each kind of being. We have knowledge of ours in our inward experience. He explained this more fully a few years later.
11 First, the general concept of ius, with reference to a person, is: facultas, ea, quae sibi bona sunt, agendi (a faculty to do that which, for the agent, is good) (Darjes 1751, 2.3 also e.g. 2.6, 2.9, 3.1). Secondly, the particular concept of ius naturae, understood subiective (subjectively), is the ius that by nature inheres in the person. Our essence, actualised, has by nature conatus (strivings) or stimuli (promptings). These direct us to what is appropriate to our nature, or, in other words, quod nobis bonum est (what is good for us). Ius naturae in this sense he will call ius naturae subiective sumtum (ius of nature taken subjectively).
Darjes used this Aristotelian-Stoic teleological account of human nature to oppose what he saw as Schmauss's indiscriminate acceptance of natural instincts. A full account of Darjes's view on this is ruled out for reasons of space, but a strikingly similar account can be found three centuries later in Maritain (see Maritain 1961, 84-89) . This may seem surprising, but the common, ultimately Aristotelian, background explains the similarity.
Darjes's account is far from clear. On the one hand, the natural ius, subjectively understood, is defined as something manifested in inwardly felt propensities that are part of our actualised essence. On the other hand, this ius is defined in the standard way, as a faculty (ability, power, capacity). Perhaps Darjes thought that it can be defined as a faculty to act in accordance with the human good. If so, his proposal could be interpreted as an alternative to Achenwall's faculty to act morally licitly, and to Grotius's faculty to act iuste.
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Thomas Mautner But along with this, Guzmán attributes to Darjes (2003, § §6-7) the view that the subjectivity of ius consists in a person's ability to act in a manner which the person believes or knows to be good, and this is construed as an instance of the contrast between appearance and reality, between what is subjectively perceived and what is objectively the case.
Given the particular way in which Darjes took ius to be an ability to do what is good, but only insofar as it is understood or known [by the agent] to be good, he thought that for this reason it could be said that one looks at ius subjectively. since, acording to this new language, to regard things as they are known or thought, is indeed subiective [subjectively] in the same sense as belief can be taken to be that which is for everyone what he understands it to be [. . .] subjectively it is true for me insofar as and as long as it seems so to me. [. . .] In contrast, the law is ius objective sumto insofar as it is something external to the understanding or conception.
12
Whether such a theory of the nature of a right-implausible as it is-is actually in Darjes is doubtful. But a detailed analysis of this must await another occasion.
It appears, then, that it was by the mid-eighteenth century that the subjective/objective terminology was first used to distinguish ius in the objective sense of law or the Law from ius in the subjective sense of a right.
The only Latin variant-not without merit-which has come to my notice is one in A. van Hove (van Hove 1928, n.2). He uses adjectives to qualify ius, retains the meaning of ius subiectivum, but gives a new name, ius normativum, for what would otherwise be known as ius obiectivum, and reserves ius obiectivum for the suum, i.e. that which is a person's own, typically including, as in Locke, life, liberty health, limb and goods, but not necessarily limited to these. The importance of this distinctive concept of one's own is often neglected in the literature (cf. Olivecrona 2010).
"Recht" Said to Have a Subjective Sense
Later in the eighteenth century, the vernacular was increasingly preferred to Latin, and in German, Recht, which has the same ambiguity as ius, could accordingly be understood either im subjektiven Sinn(e) (in a subjective sense) or im objektiven Sinn(e) (in a subjective sense). (Bedeutung was also used, but Sinn has prevailed.) An alternative pair of expressions emerged later: subjektives Recht and objektives Recht. It can be taken as a harmless variant which has the virtue of brevity (four words instead of eight). When it came in, the use of Latin was in decline, so ius subiectivum / obiectivum would be rare. What is said here about German later applied to many other languages.
However, the shorter expressions make it sound as if the distinction was between two kinds or instances of Recht, rather than two senses of "Recht". This is not necessarily misleading. Given certain assumptions about the nature and source of obligatory force (or "normativity"), the shorter expressions may have been so intended. To illustrate the point: assume that all law expresses the will of a sovereign authority. English law and French law would be two instances of the same feature, since the sovereign authority is not the same. It would be incorrect to say that "law" in those expressions was used in two different senses. In a similar way, the two kinds or instances of Recht we are discussing would differ in that one would flow from the will of an autonomous person, the other from the will of an entity external to the individual (the sovereign, the people, nature, God). This outlook found striking expression in the following statement:
In virtue of human personhood, the essence of which is self-causality and selfreflexivity, this realm, bestowed on man by the moral power of Law, becomes necessarily his own, a moral power intrinsic to himself over against others. The others are morally obliged towards him-not only towards God, or their conscience, or the legal system. He is not merely the party to whom they owe a duty, but he is the ground of their duty. This is the nature of the rights which belong to a person. (Stahl 1845, 218) 13 Rights in this sense mark a realm of individual sovereignty, a conception that had come to expression in Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and a host of writers of natural law and on politics since. To this conception pertains the view that the person is the ground of others' obligations. In this spirit, leading authors in nineteenth-century Germany defined a right as a Willensmacht (a power inherent in a person's will). What was then added, under the influence of Rousseau and Kant, was the idea of the sacredness and absolute value of personhood: unconditional respect was its due. 13 The German original: "Kraft der Persönlichkeit des Menschen, deren Wesen ja Selbstursäch-lichkeit und Koncentrirung (Rückbeziehung) auf sich ist, wird diese Sphäre, welche ihm durch die sittliche Macht des Rechts angewiesen ist, notwendig zu seiner eignen, ihm selbst innewohnenden sittlichen Macht gegen die andern. Diese sind ihm -nicht bloss Gott, oder ihrem Gewissen oder der Rechtsordnung in Beziehung auf ihn-sittlich gebunden, er ist nicht blosser Gegenstand ihrer Pflicht, sondern Ursache derselbe. Dies ist das Recht im subjektiven Sinne oder die Rechte."
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Thomas Mautner Ahrens 1871, 19-20) .
The central place of personhood as the ultimate source of people's rights in the theories by the early nineteenth century has been well described in an article by Diethelm Klippel (1995, 287) .
This way of thinking contains a "tension" that defies clear explanation: the individual's sovereign realm is granted him by the Law, and yet the same realm is also said to be intrinsic to him, flowing from his being a person with an essential claim to respect.
Still, leaving aside such theoretical frameworks, the pair of terms can be understood to distinguish senses of "Recht" rather than kinds of Recht.
It took some time for the new terminology to be fully established as part of the standard vocabulary in legal or moral theory. It is not mentioned even in the revised second edition of Krug's encyclopedia (Krug 1833 (Krug , 1838 . As late as 1897 Amira writes das sog. [= so-called] subjektive Recht (Amira 1897, 7) . 15 However, "German lawyers today use objektives Recht to mean 'law,' and subjektives Recht to mean a 'right' someone has" (Byrd and Hruschka 2010, 28) .
We saw that the solecism we are tracing could not have been due to present-day scholars' immersion in medieval and early-modern Latin texts, since the corresponding Latin expression did not exist. Could it have been inspired by a close engagement with eighteenth-century German Ius naturae, where the Latin neologism emerged, or with its continuations as Naturrecht, Rechtsphilosophie or allgemeine Rechtslehre? This is most unlikely. Its origin should be sought elsewhere.
Other Languages
The equivalents to ius and Recht, with the same ambiguity, are present in most European languages. One reliable source names six Romance, six Germanic, and eight Slavic languages. Even Lithuanians and Letts have it, not to mention the Finns. 16 Scholars writing in those languages also began similarly to disambiguate. Examples are droit subjectif / objectif in French and diritto soggettivo / oggettivo in Italian. The same source also notes that (apart from modern Greek) English is the great exception.
At this point, a simple 
English
In English, law cannot replace right. Human laws are not the same as human rights. (Except that poor translation and editorial non-intervention have allowed "law" and "subjective law" to be used instead of "right" in two major articles in a leading scholarly journal (Zarka 1999a (Zarka , 1999b . Elsewhere, subjektives Recht has become "Law in a Subjective Sense" (see Kelsen 1960, 130; 1967, 129) , although the English word "law" does not have a subjective sense. Nor can right replace law. Consider Roman Law, the law of torts, criminal law, replace law with right, and note the result. Nor is a natural right the same as a natural law. Obviously, English does not need the disambiguation.
These remarks have the support of authority: neither Samuel Johnson's dictionary of 1755, nor the OED include law s.v. "right, n." In the 1780s, Bentham took it for granted that in English right does not have the sense of law-and regretted the fact. He noted that law was ambiguous and that long ago, right had been used like Recht and regretted that this was no longer the case: The foremost of Bentham's followers, John Austin, agreed that "right" had lost the sense of Law (see Austin 1954, 285-8) , but did not consider it a disadvantage. He noted that in Latin the name which signifies right as 17 The two senses are discussed in Salmond 1966, 48. 18 See also Bentham 1970, 17.23. (Austin 1954, 287) , and complained that the German writers, like Kant and many of his followers, often blurred the two meanings, and that when they distinguished objektives from subjektives Recht, they erred in taking Recht to signify one genus divided into "two species or sorts," in spite of the fact that "law" and "faculty" cannot be so understood.
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The confusion of law and right, he continued (see Austin 1954, 288) , is avoided by our writers because commonly the two things denoted have these clearly different words to denote them. Austin's commitment to the theory that all moral and legal duties are commands from a superior able to enforce them made it difficult for him to make sense of the notions of the obligation-creating power of autonomous willing and of the intrinsic value of personhood.
Nevertheless, "right" in an objective sense is perhaps not entirely extinct. First, some inherited phrases are indeterminate between the two: e.g. "by right of nature." Secondly, although the ancient Germanic usage is absent from Samuel Johnson's dictionary in the mid-1750s, Thomas Rutherforth states at that time in his lectures on Grotius that it occurs, though "very seldom" (Rutherforth 1754, 1.24) . Contrary to Bentham, Austin concedes that it appears, albeit rarely. Thirdly, deviations from correct usage occur because of foreign-language influences. Hegel's Philosophie des Rechts should of course be Philosophy of Law.
20 Leo Strauss's influential work about theories of natural law and political justice would, but for political developments in 1930s Germany, no doubt have been published as Naturrecht und Geschichte, which indeed became the title of the later German edition (1956) of his misnamed Natural Right and History (1953) . Maybe he rejected friendly advice, maybe none was offered. One recent author, obviously under French influence, treats natural law and natural right as fully interchangeable. 21 None of the above, however, creates any need for the continental-style disambiguation.
The Rise of the Solecism
Austin, like Bentham, as we have seen, saw no need to adjoin subjective to right. During the next 150 years almost everyone in the human and social sciences who wrote on legal, moral or political subjects agreed.
It was not until about 1980 that a change set in. It is illustrated by the quotations that follow. Earlier examples are rare. The ones that follow are a minute random selection from quite a large collection. They illustrate a lexical point, so the comments on content are few and brief.
19 This is also the view of Jean Dabin: The second elements in droit-règle and droit-prérogatif do not qualify a notion univoque (see Dabin 1952) . 20 Ernest Barker (1934, xxii, liii) agrees. 21 Edelstein (2009, 33, 34, 36) (Zuckert 1998, 141) . (The statement is not correct. Grotius did not reserve the term jus in this way: he recognised and used different senses of the word. See in this regard Grotius 1625, 1.1.3-6 and 1.1.9). 9. "Yet, within limits we have the subjective right to do what is objectively wrong" (Zuckert 2001, 125) . 10. "[In Grotius] the duty to respect the subjective rights of others becomes paramount" (Harvey 2006, 35) . 11. " [W] hat present-day scholars and theorists have termed subjective rights in the sense that they are thought to inhere in each individual person by nature" (Zagorin 2009, 23) . (A mistake: the rights need not be natural.) 12. "It is true that subjective rights have, historically, been associated with rights as dominium" (Waldron 2010, 229) .
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The quoted statements are all recent. Many of them indicate that what they refer to has only recently come to be called "subjective right." What it was called earlier is left unexplained. It is notable that in most of them "subjective" as an adjective to "right" can simply be deleted (in some cases with slight re-phrasing) without any change of meaning. For example: "A 22 In contrast, the expression does not appear in Waldron 1986. right to do wrong" omits nothing from item 9 and is more elegant (see Waldron 1981) . What inspired this neologism? It is not needed for disambiguation. We saw earlier that it could not have been inspired by mediaeval and earlymodern writings. An influence on terminology from eighteenth-century Ius naturae and Naturrecht or subsequent nineteenth-century legal or political theory is unlikely. It would have manifested itself much earlier. We have to look elsewhere.
A Theory of the Origin of Rights-Concepts
Among those who in the post-war period devoted themselves to a study of the history of moral and political thought, Michel Villey came to play quite a significant part (see Villey 1964 Villey , 1968 and many other writings). He maintained-rightly-that the historiography of rightsconcepts had to look back beyond Grotius. A central thesis of his was that the modern concept of a right had its origin in the writings of William of Ockham, and that it was shaped in the course of the polemic against Pope John XXII that began in 1321, on the question of evangelical poverty. 23 The Franciscan position, defended by Ockham, was that having taken a vow of poverty, they had no property and nothing was their own. They made use of basic necessities (food, raiment, shelter) but they did not own anything. It was, according to Villey, in this context that the concept of property rights and other real rights came to be defined. As the possessor of a right in this sense the person is in control and decides what is lawful and unlawful, right and wrong. The characterisation of the conception of a droit subjectif that Villey spells out in some detail is rather similar to Stahl's, quoted above. 24 But his attribution of such a full-blown conception to Ockham is no doubt an anachronism. It is all the more doubtful since there is a transition in Villey's argument that may not have received sufficient critical examination in the literature. The transition is from rights of ownership or use of goods, debated in the context of Franciscan poverty, to rights of the kinds belonging to a ruler, a master, a parent, a creditor, or a free and autonomous person. It is rights of these kinds, rather than rights in things, that are central to the modern individualism that Villey went on to attack. Therefore, Ockham's disquisitions on matters of interest only to mendicant friars would hardly be relevant for the emergence of the concept of a right as a potestas or facultas moralis. When later writers on natural law 23 John Kilcullen gives a clear and informative account of the background and content of the controversy: see Kilcullen 2001 . 24 "This kind of right which in the last analysis would be derived from the very being of the subject, his essence, his nature" (Villey 1969, 145 mentioned Ockham, it was hardly ever in relation to this, but to the voluntarism usually attributed to him. (Whether the attribution was reasonable has been disputed: "It would seem that Ockham's theory is not voluntarist." Kilcullen 2001, vol. 2, 882 ).
Villey had not found any "subject"-expressions before the 1660s (Leibniz), but did not raise the question why it took hundreds of years for the new conception to be so labelled. He writes that the sense of subjektiv in the Pandectists is inherited from the old scholastic usage and seems unaware of the change in meaning of which Guzmán's survey serves as a reminder (Villey 1969, 144-5) .
As with most histories, there is an ulterior motive. Villey wanted to convey a message. We should realise, he argued, that the new conception of rights was the first step on the downhill road to modernity, individualism, egoism, and neglect of social solidarity and the common good, away from the superior conception of an overall objective and just order which was given a classical statement by Thomas Aquinas (Villey 1969, 141) . The mediaeval Aristotelian synthesis of Aquinas had been the high point of philosophy, from which later scholastics such as Duns Scotus and Ockham had fallen away. The path of modern philosophy had been further downward. Hobbes, Spinoza, Gassendi, Locke, Wolff were among those who contributed to the déformation. Villey did not agree that, as asserted e.g. by Jacques Maritain (1961, 84) , it was Grotius who began deforming the genuine idea of natural law. The decline had begun earlier.
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A sketch as brief as this cannot do full justice to Villey's account of rights-concepts and their history. Insightful expositions and criticisms are made in writings by Brian Tierney from the 1980s onward (Tierney 1997) . They are a rich source of information about mediaeval thought and contain significant objections to many of Villey's theses (Tierney 1997, 13) . He shows that concepts claimed to have originated with Ockham were current much earlier.
In the 1970s, Cambridge scholars with an interest in the history of moral and political thought had become acquainted with Villey's work. Important parts of his account of the origin of the concept of a right found acceptance in Quentin Skinner's The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Skinner 1978) and in Richard Tuck's Natural Rights Theories (Tuck 1979) . Since then, Villey's thought, "always interesting, sometimes idiosyncratic" has become "widely and uncritically accepted" (Tierney 1997, 14) . There were earlier admirers also. Orestano wrote enthusiastically of "the important and brilliant contribution of Villey" (Orestano 1960, 3) . More recently 25 The same perspective has been re-affirmed by Edward Feser in his The Last Superstition (Feser 2008) . Anthony Kenny's review (Kenny 2011) describes and criticises his view of an epochal decline, from the high point reached in the medieval Aristotelian synthesis of St Thomas Aquinas, via a sequence of intellectual disasters, to the unhealthy philosophical condition of our times.
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Thomas Mautner Yves-Charles Zarka mentions with approval the "classic" works of Lagarde and Villey (Zarka 1999a, 16).
Aetiology and Diffusion
Up to this point, we have considered, first, how ius was conceived as a power, potestas, an attribute of a subject, i.e. a person, and secondly, how, centuries later "ius" first could be said to be subiective sumptum and ius, soon after, to be subiectivum. It is now time to turn to the final question: how did the superfluous subjective come to be added to right? The answer to that question is simple: Villey wrote in French! It was natural, indeed necessary, for Villey to write droit subjectif. What is astonishing is that the adjective was not cut adrift and left to perish in the waves when his ideas crossed the Channel and found a welcome in Cambridge. Left behind on the quay, however, and not conveyed on "that one and twenty miles sailing" was the conservative message of decline that Villey associated with his historical analysis. Skinner put subjective within inverted commas in some places, but omitted them elsewhere, 26 and in Tuck's book subjective right appeared many times, though mainly (or only?) in the sections which deal with Villey's views. Because of the influence of their works, of which, with respect to this particular lexical development, the latter has probably played a greater part, it is not only Villey's debatable theory that has gained wide acceptance, but also the pleonastic expression which, coined somewhat carelessly, is an unidiomatic calque.
It is puzzling that this new solecism has continued to spread widely, albeit not uniformly. "Academic life is not marked only by fashion but also by its uneven diffusion" (Hall 2010, 128) . Could the wide uptake in part be due to a fear of appearing to be out of touch, a readiness "deferentially to submit to the fashion at present prevailing"? (Thackeray 2001, 747) .
No such suspicion could possibly be entertained about Tierney. It is therefore strange indeed that he would use the redundant expression and even more mystifying that it appears frequently only in chapters 1, 5, 9, and 11 and sparingly or not at all in chapter 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 10 of The Idea of Natural Rights, even though they all deal with the same range of subjects. Particularly baffling is the later insertion of "subjective" into the wellformulated sentence "The concept of individual rights has become central to our political discourse [. . .]" (Tierney 1988, 5). 27 It seems, then, that this meme (sit venia verbo), which has proliferated in the recent literature on moral and political thought and its history, began with the Cambridge reception of Villey at the end of the 1970s. 26 Likewise Geoffrey Samuel in Samuel 1989. 27 The insertion is in the revised version which became Chapter 1 of Tierney 1997. In some cases, however, a direct influence from another language will be discernible, especially when an author whose mother tongue is not English is let down by anglophone helpers and editors. Also, beyond moral and political thought and its history, in disciplines such as international law and international private law, many instances of the pleonasm appear in reports, papers and treatises, be they poorly translated or of local origin. The same applies to what is produced by non-governmental organisations, transnational enterprises and other international bodies. Christian Tams's apt comment on this will be quoted below.
How Rights

Harmful Consequences
Many lexical aberrations are only that. The reason why the one here exposed requires special attention is that its use creates obscurity and confusion and is spreading into textbooks.
In French, and similarly in other continental languages, droit subjectif/ droit objectif are technical terms. They are unknown even to persons whose command of the language is unquestionable but who are unfamiliar with the more specialised literature on law and justice in which these expressions are explained. In contrast, although subjective right enters discourse as a technical term, 28 it is explained inadequately or left unexplained. If it is left unexplained, the innocent reader will be led to believe that he is ignorant of a concept that he ought to be familiar with, but he will assume that "subjective" adds something to "right". Failure is guaranteed, since a "subjective right" is nothing but a subjektives Recht, droit subjectif, etc., that is-a right.
Some authors do, however, define the expression. Their definitions will let "subjective" add something to "right" and, again for the same reason, failure is guaranteed. It is like letting "female" add something to "vixen."
One attempt is by defining subjective rights as those which belong to a particular individual. "Such rights are often therefore referred to as 'subjective rights', meaning that they apply to particular subjects" (McKinnell 2010) . The implied contrast is with rights that belong to authorities or corporations or other non-individuals. But in the literature, so-called subjective rights are, like rights, commonly attributed also to the latter. For example: "[. . .] giving students, parents, and relative authorities subjective rights in shaping religious instruction" (Dromgold and Schneider 2010) . See also the statement in Tams 2005, quoted below.
Given the terminological/conceptual fog surrounding this ill-defined expression, it is not surprising that an author can come to endorse both of these contrary standpoints. On the one hand he writes of "the subjective 28 Collins Wordbanks Online: English (August 2011) confirms this strongly.
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Thomas Mautner A subjective right is an individual's good-faith belief about his rights; this belief gives him title to coerce others to keep off his property or to allow him bodily inviolability. But it does not yet place other people under a correlative duty. (Stilz 2009, 47-8) This means that a "subjective right" is not something that a subject has, but something which a subject believes that he has. This has unfortunate implications. A person who is unaware of the fact that he is an inheritor would have no "subjective right" to the inheritance. If, on the other hand, someone wrongly believes that he is an inheritor, his belief would give him title to coerce others. An expression like "subjective right" naturally calls for a contrasting expression. The obvious candidate is "objective right." Some authors avoid using the latter, and some who do use it wisely refrain from explaining it. Others are braver. In their struggle to make sense of this contrast between "subjective right" and "objective right," they propose that "right" in the first is a noun, and in the second an adjective, and that this is made explicit by the words "subjective" and "objective" (see Edmundson 2004, 8-9; Ivison 2007, 7ff.; Vincent 2010, 13, 33, 56 )! This evidently will not do. For one thing, as an adjective, "right" has to be qualified by an adverb. To add to the confusion, it is also suggested that "the 'object' in objective right is, if anything, the global object of moral assessment or prescription" (Edmundson 2004, 9) .
Reactions and Protests
Material examined for this paper suggests that some authors feel uncomfortable with the neologism, and if asked to explain might feel slightly embarrassed. When in November 2010, a scholar (no personal acquaintance) circulated a paper to be presented at a seminar, an inquiry about it received a gracious answer by e-mail. It reads in part:
You are quite right to pull me up about subjective rights: the term is most unsatisfactory, in part, I suspect, because it is wrenched from its original context in nineteenth-century German political thinking (but I read German only very slowly and haven't yet investigated this important point). Most Anglo-American writers at some point use the term, but few give any clear account of the criterion by which they distinguish "objective" from "subjective." Explicit misgivings about this solecism are rare. Martin Golding writes, "I do not particularly care for this terminology" (Golding 1984, 126) . Christian Tams's statement (truncated for lack of space) is the only more fully articulated protest found so far:
How Rights
Some of the discussion about [subjective rights] seems to be based on the assumption that the circle of subjective rights were narrower than that of other rights. This assumption is unfounded [. . .] In fact, whether subjective rights can be meaningfully distinguished from other types of rights, may be open to doubt. [. . .] "subjective right" appears to be used as a direct translation from other languages, in which the notion of "droit subjectif" or "subjektives Recht" is indeed very common. [. . .] These languages use the same expression (droit, Recht, etc.) in order to describe (i) the sum total of legal rules (i.e. "law"), and (ii) claim that enjoys legal protection ("right"). [. . .] where (as in the English language) the two mentioned above are expressed by entirely different words, such as "law" and "right", the attributes seem superfluous. (Tams 2005, 33) Similarly, "There is no trace in the Anglo-American tradition [of describing] rights as being 'subjective' " (Campbell 2011 ).
Concluding Remark
It would seem that the tautological expression is not needed. The inquiry into its emergence has however, brought to view parts of a terminological/ conceptual history which help elucidate features of current concepts of rights.
Postscript
What has been said suggests that terminological novelties should be treated with circumspection. So, as a counterpart to Ockham's razor, we could also have the principle: "Avoid technical terms as far as possible."
29
It is easier to memorise if we give it a name, so let it be called Leibniz's razor. 29 In Leibniz's words: "[Ostensum est] terminis technicis abstinendum esse, quoad eius fieri potest" (Leibniz 1990b, 418, line 6) . Other statements that technical terms should be shunned also at p. 411, line 8 and p. 412, line 8. They are all in the prefatory dissertation to Nizolius 1670 (Leibniz 1990b ). Leibniz himself seems to have thought of this principle as a counterpart to Ockham's razor, which he formulated entia non esse multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (ibid., 428). It is of interest to note that this form of words emerged in the seventeenth century, and is alluded to, e.g., in § 223 of Bayle's Pensées diverses (see Bayle 1683, 681) . A remarkably informative account of the principle and why it came to be associated with Ockham comes from William M. Thorburn (1918, 345-53) . His account makes it likely that Leibniz found the formulation in Clauberg's Elementa philosophiae (Groningen 1647) 
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